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CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONSHOW CHARITABLE MUST THEY BE?
Richard D. Hobbet*
1.

THE CONFUSION

OVER

DONATIVE INTENT

Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 allows a de-

duction from gross income for any charitable contribution made during the taxable year. 1 By statute, to qualify a particular payment for
treatment as a section 170 deduction, the taxpayer must establish that
the payment is a "contribution or gift." 2 The courts have never distinguished between the terms "contribution" and "gift," and the
proposition that the two terms are synonymous, first enunciated by a
district court in Massachusetts in Channing v. United States, 3 is now
* J.D., University of Iowa; Professor of Law, The Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law of
Yeshiva Universit'.
The general rule of section 170(a), allowing deduction for charitable contributions made
within taxable year, subject to certain limitations, is:
(a) Allowance of deduction.(1) General rule.-There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable contribution (as defined in subsection (c)) payment of which is made within the taxable
year. A charitable contribution shall be allowable as a deduction only if verified
under regulations prescribed by the Secretary.
26 U.S.C. § 170(a)(1) (1965).
2 Pursuant to section 170(c), for the limited purposes of this article, the term "charitable
contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the use of a public entity or a corporation
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes. 26 U.S.C.
§ 170(c)(1), (2) (1954). See Rev. Rul. 73-113, 1973-1 C.B. 65.
a 4 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curiai, 67 F.2d ,986 (lst Cir. 1933), cert. denied,
291 U.S. 686 (1934). In ('hmoig, the taxpayer argue(] that the word contribution inder section
23 (n)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1928, a predecessor to the present section 170, was broad
enough to include sums "levied for the tuition of" taxpayer's children attending educational
institutions. 4 F. Supp. at 34. This claim was far from implausible, given the rule of statutory
construction that words shall be given their common or general meaning, since the primary
definition assigned to the word "contribution" by Webster's Third International Dictionary is "a
payment imposed upon a body of persons or on the population of a territory by civil, military,
or ecclesiastical authority." vEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DicICONARY (3d ed. 1971). Although it
conceded the argument that "[a]s a lexigraphic proposition ...
the word 'contribution' may
properly be employed in referring to payments of tuition," the district court in Channing stated
that "as a legal proposition," the legislative history of the particular code section in question
revealed that the term charitable "contribution" was meant to be "synonymous with the word
gift.' " 4 F. Stipp. at 34.
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firmly entrenched. 4 The question, however, of whether the word
gift for purposes of section 170 should be interpreted the same as it is
for purposes of section 102, the basic "gift" exclusion from gross income, 5 has yet to be definitively settled. 6 The problem focuses
upon the determination of whether the word gift, for purposes of section 170, contemplates an inquiry into the subjective intent or motive
of the transferor, an objective inquiring into the value of the transferred property in relation to the value of any benefits received in
exchange by the transferor, or some combination of the two.
The significance of the problem becomes apparent when one
considers the great variety of benefits, tangible and intangible, direct
and indirect, which may accrue to transferors as a result of what they
claim to be charitable contributions. At one end of the benefits spectrum is the personal satisfaction that a donor receives from a generous
act of philanthropy. At the other end is the direct and tangible
economic benefit that a transferor receives when selling property to a
charitable organization at a price below its fair market value. Within
these two extremes are benefits such as those realized by the transferor as an individual member of the general public which, as a
whole, derives benefits from the transferee's charitable activities, the
good will that a business may derive from its name being identified
with the charitable organization or property owned by it,the increased value of privately-owned property occasioned by its proximity
to a public park, roadwav or school, and the direct benefit that may
be derived from services performed for the transferor by the charitable organization, such as the use of hospital facilities by a physician or
patient who has contributed to its support. The objective approach to
the gift issue, because it requires the valuation and measurement of
all such benefits, has posed problems in determining fair market

a See, e.g., Dejong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962), affg 36 T.C. 896, 899
(1961); Oakknoll v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. M. (CCH) 1380 (1978), aff'd, 79-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH)
9328 (2d Cir. 1979); Rainer Co. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 68, 77 (1973); Rev. Rul. 72-506,
1972-2 C.B. 106; Rev. Rul. 71-112, 1971-1 C.B. 93.
' Section 102(a) of the Code provides that '[giross income does not include the value of
property acquired by gift, devise or inheritance." 26 U.S.C. § 102(2) (1954). The burden of
proving that a transfer of property, to a taxpayer is a gift rests upon the taxpayer receiving the
property. Botchford v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1936). In addition to all of the
usual elements of a gift, section 102 requires that the transfer of property must be intended by
the donor to be a gift in order to qualify the transfer for the exclusion from gross income. Bass
v. Hawley, 62 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1933).
6 It has been stated on more than one occasion that the word '[g]ifts . . . is a generic word
of broad connotation, taking coloration from the context of the particular statute in which it may
appear." Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322, 328 (1943), Putoma Corp. v. Coinmissioner, 601 F.2d 734, .746 (5th Cir. 1979).
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value which have created litigation in a wide variety of tax contexts.
By the same token, the attempt to determine the transferor's subjective motive for making the transfer presents a difficult task for both
judges and juries. 7 Both tests, of course, present burden of proof
problems for taxpayers. 8 The subjective test places uncomfortably
excessive reliance upon the self-serving testimony of the taxpayer,
while the objective test places an equally discomforting reliance upon
the "expert" witnesses employed for the purposes of valuation. It is
not surprising that the courts have had difficulty in settling upon one
test or the other, and have frequently vacillated on the question of
whether one test or the other can be generally adopted to resolve the
various cases brought under section 170.9
Bok v. McCaughn, 10 an early case which had some influence on

the development of this issue,"

emphasized the transferor's motive

in defining charity. 12 The analysis of the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit borrowed from a charitable trust case from the Supreme
Court, Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 13 the sentiment that a charitable

gift is that which " 'is given for the love of God, or the love of your
neighbor, in the Catholic or universal sense, . . . free from the stain
or taint of every consideration that is personal, private, or selfish.' "14 In Commissioner v. Duberstein, 15 the more recent decision
attempting to assign a lneaning to the term gift, the Suprele Court

rejected the government's attempt to have a specific test adopted and
uniformly applied by the courts in section 102 cases.

16

Instead, the

7 The Supreme Court no doubt acknowledged the difficulties inherent in the subjective
approach in Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960), when it stated that in determining "'the dominant reason" for the transfer, the determination "'must be based ultimately on the
application of the fact-finding tribunal's experience with the mainsprings of human conduct to
the totality of the facts of each case." 363 U.S. at 286, 289. See Klein, An Enigma in the Federal
Income Tax: The Meaning of the Word "Gift", 48 MINN. L. REV. 215, 219-21 (1963). See also
Rev. Rul. 71-112, 1971-9 I.R.B. 16.
8 It is settled beond question that [t]he burden of proving that a particular paylment is a
'contribution or gift' is on the taxpayer." Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087, 1089 (W. D.
Mich. 1978).
9 See id. at 1089-90.
10 42 F.2d at 616 (3d Cir. 1930).
11 See DeJong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1962).
12 42 F.2d at 618-19.
13 43 U.S. (2 How.) 128 (1844).
14 42 F.2d at 619. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit continued in its "emphasis on
the motive which prompts [the transferor's] action" by further stating that '[c]harity means such
unselfish things as are wont to be done b- those who are animated b-- the virtue of love." Id.
15 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
16 Id. at 284. The government's proposed test was noted hs the Court: '"'[g]ifts should be
defined as transfers of property made for personal as distinguished from business reasons.'
at n.6.

Id.
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Court held that the most critical consideration in ascertaining tile
transferor's "'intention" is "what the basic reason for his conduct was
in fact-the dominant reason that explains his action ini making the
transfer." 17 That determination, the Duberstein Court concluded, is
to be reached by the triers of fact and not to be disturbed on appeal
unless "clearly erroneous."' 18 In authoring the Duberstein opinion,
however, Justice Brennan reviewed prior decisions of the Court in
similar cases, and stated that "[a] gift in the statutory sense . . . proceeds from a 'detached and disinterested generosity; out of affection,
respect, admiration, charity or like impulses.' "19 This language ini
Duberstein strongly suggests that the Court meant for the determination of gift vel nol to turn on the subjective intention of the transferor. 20
Following the Duberstein decision, the Tax Court in DeJong V.
Commissioter21 decided that this same test was appropriate in defining gift for purposes of section 170. 22 As precedent, however,
Dejong was clouded in that the Internal Revenue Service had clearly
presented the issue to the court on the basis of an objective determination. The Dejongs were parents with children in attendance at a
Christian school which derived its principal support from parents of
enrolled students. 23 Contributions had been solicited from taxpayers
based upon the educational society's estimation of the parents' ability
to pay. 24 The parents responded with "donations" in excess of the
per pupil cost of operating the school, and deducted the entire
amount as a charitable contribution. The Service conceded the deductibility of that portion of the contributions which exceeded the per
pupil cost, but disallowed the balance as a payment in the nature of a
tuition fee paid for the education of the children. Because the actual
cost per student was a stipulated fact before the Tax Court, 25 the
17 363 U.S. at 286. While the Court recognized that its approach to the gift problem would
probably "not satisfv an academic desire for tidiness, symmetry and precision in this area," it
"[did] not think it profitable to go" any further in attempting to clear up the uncertainty inherent. in ascertaining "intention." Id. at 290, 286. See Klein, supra note 7, at 216-17.
18 363 U.S. at 288-91.
19 Id. at 285 (quoting Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956); Robertson v.
United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952)).
20 See Klein, supra note 7, at 218-19.
21 36 T.C. 896 (1958), aff'd, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962).
22 36 T.C. at 899.
23 309 F.2d at 374.
24 Id. at 375. Although the educational society set no fixed tuition fee, and no student was

ever denied admission to the society's schools for failure of his parents to contribute, 36 T.C. at
898, parents were encouraged to contribute according to their means, and at least to the extent
of the society's per pupil cost of providing an education. 309 F.2d at 379.
25 36 T.C. at 900.
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objective test could have been easily applied as the sole basis for
decision, but the Tax Court shored up its opinion by citing
Diiberstein and stating that "if a payment proceeds primarily from the
incentive of anticipated benefit to tile payor beyond the satisfhction
which flows from the performance of a generous act, it is not a
gift."26 The Tax Court's findings as to the Dejongs' actual motiva27
tions were af'rmed by tile Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,

which explicitly stated that the subjective criteria of Duberstein"detached and disinterested generosity" or "affection, admiration,
charity or like impulses"-was clearly applicable to a charitable deduction under section 170.28
A more appropriate case for considering the nature of the benefit
received by the transferor reached the Court of Claims in Singer Co.
v. United States, 29 a case involving a corporate transferor of property
to charitable and educational organizations. 30 Singer manufactured
and distributed sewing machines, both in the United States and
abroad. 31 In 1954 Singer, following an established practice, sold
sewing machines to a variety of charitable organizations at discounts of

26

Id. at 899. In holding that the portion of the payment disallowed by the Commissioner

was indeed in the nature of tuition fees for the society's education of taxpayers' children, and
not deductible charitable contributions under section 170, the Tax Court stated:
Payments pledged and made by parents in the circumstances disclosed by the evideuce were not voluntary and gratuitous contributions motivated merely by the
satisfaction which flows from the performance of a generous act; they were induced,
at least in substantial part, by the benefits which the parents sought and anticipated
from the enrollment of their children as students in the society's school.
Id. at 899-900.
27 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962).
28 Id. at 379. Quoting Duberstein, the section 102 case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in DeJong stated:
The value of a gift may be excluded from the gross income only if the gift proceeds
from a "detached and disinterested generosity" or "'out of affection, admiration,
charity or like impulses" and must be included if the claimed gift proceeds primarilyfrom "the constraining force of any moral or legal duty" or from "'the incentive of
anticipated benefit of an economic nature."
Id. Six years later the same court of appeals rejected this subjective test for a case involving a
corporate transfer, deeming it inappropriate to attempt to assign motives such as disinterested
generosity, affection, respect, admiration and like impulses to corporations. United States v.
Transamerica Corp., 392 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1968). The court suggested that requiring
corporations to evidence such subjective motivation and lack of business purpose would tend to
render ultra vires substantially all charitable contributions from corporations and thereby frustrate the intent of Congress that corporations should enjoy section 170 deductions, Id. Rather,
the court stated that the corporation "received a direct economic benefit, a quid pro quo not
unlike that received by the taxpayer in Dejong, the securing of which was the sole purpose of
its transfer and payment." Id.
29 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
30 Id. at 414-15.
31

Id.
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up to forty-five percent of its established retail selling price, 32 claiming
a charitable contribution deduction in the total amount of the
discounts. 33 The corporate taxpayer, in attempting to defend its deductions under section 170, argued that the definition of gift as
developed in Duberstein and its progeny was not applicable to charitable contribution cases. 34 In particular, Singer claimed that the subjective standard of "disinterested generosity" and the like was inappropriate in cases involving corporate transferors. 35 Noting the
disagreement among the various courts with regard to the applicability
of the Duberstein test to corporate contributors, the Court of Claims
"avoid[ed] resting [its] decision on the 'disinterested
generosity'

rules." 36

Instead, using what could be described as a hybrid

objective-subjective analysis, the court stated that "Jilf the transfer
was made with the expectation of receiving something in return as a

quid pro quo for the transfer then in such an instance the I.R.C.
section 170 deduction [must be] denied." 3 7 The court, however, also
found it important that the predominant purpose of the taxpayer's
allowing the discounts to public and parochial schools was to "enlarg[e] the future potential market by developing prospective purchasers of home sewing machines and, more particularly, Singer
32 Id. at 415-16. The Court of Claims determined that Singer's retail selling price was the
fair market value of the machines. hd. at 417-18. In so finding, the Court relied upon Treasury
Regulation 1.170-1(c)(1), which defined fair market value as "the price at which the property
would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller." 449 F.2d at 417. Therefore,
the court determined that the discounted sales were, in fact, made at a bargain. Id. at 418. For
further discussion of several bargain sale cases which bear upon the gift analysis, see notes
105-09 infra and accompanying text.
33 449 F.2d at 416.
34 Id. at 421.
35 Id. Taxpayer sought to have the court turn its conclusion upon a determination whether
any benefits received by the transferor from the charitable transferee were received directly,
with a substantial quid pro quo, or only indirectly. id. at 422. If received oniy indirectly, Singer
maintained, the transfer would still qualify as a charitable contribution or gift under section 170.
Id
36 Id. at 421-22. The court cited the specific rejection of the Duberstein test bv the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Transamerica Corp., 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir.
1968), see note 28 supra, and expressed an "uneasiness" about applying an approach which it
found not to be "the most judicious." 449 F.2d at 422, 423.
37 449 F.2d at 421-22. From this assemblage of cases and this suggested standard, the court
in Singer constructed its own test:
It is our opinion that if the benefits received, or expected to be received, are substantial, and meaning by that, benefits greater than those that inure to the general
public from transfers for charitable purposes (which benefits are merely incidental
to the transfer), then in such case we feel the transferor has received, or expects to
receive, a quid pro quo sufficient to remove the transfer from the realn of deductibility under section 170.
Id. at 423.
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machines-the brand on which the future buyers learned to sew." 3
Reliance upon this finding, however, left the court on somewhat
tenuous ground, for the benefit received was a form of goodwill,
which was obviously difficult to value against the total claimed deduction. This problem was avoided only by the court's promulgation of
its hybrid standard, 39 which provided a rationale for disallowing the
charitable contribution deduiction altogether.
Reading Singer as a whole, it is not readily apparent whether the
court intended that the transferor's benefit be measured against those
benefits received by the general public, or whether the benefits received by the transferor must be greater than those that would incidentally inure to it as a member of the general public in order to be
regarded as substantial. The better view would be to first determine
whether the taxpayer has received a direct benefit from the recipient
organization, disregarding whether it may also happen to benefit incidentally as a member of the general public. 40 Once it is determined
that a direct benefit has been received, an objective test could focus
upon the value of that direct benefit, measuring it against the benefit
received by the public by virtue of the contribution, and not against
an\y incidental benefit received by the taxpayer. 41

38

Id. at 423. This predominant reason for the transferor's action was deemed by the court

to be "other than charitable." 1d. at 424.
'9 See note 37 supra.
40 A finding that the taxpayer's benefit was only incidental to that which it received as a
member of the general public has allowed the charitable contribution deduction. See, e.g.,
Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 900 (XV. D.S.C. 1965) (taxpayer benefited from improved community relations in communitN where business was developing); Rev.
Rul. 67-446, 1967-2 C.B. 119 (removal of railroad traffic through city benefited commercial
donors); Tooke v. Tomlison, 312 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1963) (transferors benefited from improved
street and sewer lines).
4I Confusion on this point can lead to error. In Scharf v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH)
1247 (1973), a taxpayer owned property with a fire-damaged building on it, which could not be
used without renovation and was about to be condemned by iMunicipal authorities. The Tax
Court judge found that there was no doubt that clearance of the building from the site would
enhance the value of' the land and imake it far more easils marketable. Taxpayer donated the
building to the local fire department for use in training firemen in fire fighting. This resulted in
the destruction of' the building by fire and taxpayer then completed the clearing of the land.
The court said, "the benefit flowing back to petitioner, consisting of clearer land, was far less
than the greater benefit flowing to the volunteer fire department's training and equipment testing operations." Id. at 1252. This implies that the value to the public might be greater than the
value of the donated building which the court found to be $12,835, which should not be the
case when one considers that fair market value of property should be that value which it has for
its highest and best use. The court then failed to determine the increased value of the cleared
land, the value of the benefit received bv the taxpayer. In the absence of proof of this value by
the taxpayer, the contribution deduction should clearly have been disallowed, based on the
court's own finding that the taxpayer was at least in part motivated by his own private benefit.
Id. at 1251. Notwithstanding the potential for coifusion by the lack of clarity in the formulation
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The court in Singer concluded that, with respect to the school
discounts, the expectation of future sales provided a sufficient quid
pro quo to disallow the charitable contribution, notwithstanding that
the expectation may not have been fully realized. On the other hand,
with respect to discounts to churches, hospitals, and the Red Cross,
the court found that the "'primary purpose . . . was to assist the recipient organizations in the performance of the charitable, religious, or
public services that they were currently providing."- 42 The court also
adopted the finding that "the incidental effect of this policy was the
development and maintenance of a favorable public image for plaintiff
in the eves of those organizations and their members. " 4 3 Once again
the analysis is confused in that the "incidental" benefit received by
the taxpayer did not flow to it as a member of the general public.
Whatever goodwill the discounts generated accrued directly to
the taxpayer. The public received other types of benefits which, of
course, the taxpayer shared. But the Singer court was persuaded that
the taxpayer could not derive substantial benefits from the charities
other than schools by wa' of increased sales, and therefore the charitable contribution deduction for discounts to those charities was allowed.
It is not clear whether the Court of Claims' confusing analysis is
enough to establish Singer as a leading case for an objective test
for determining gift status under section 170. The court wanted to
eschew an examination into subjective intent, 4 4 but ultimately it
relied heavily upon its findings as to primary purpose in determining
the substantiality of benefits which the taxpayer might expect while
making no attempt to measure the value of those future benefits. Had
it required such a measurement for purposes of applying a purel\
objective standard, it no doubt would have been forced to disallow all
the claimed deductions on a failure of the taxpayer to prove the value
of the benefits which it might receive.
In an earlier case, Crosby Valce & Gage Co. v. Commnissioner, 45
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had emphatically rejected
the use of the subjective Duberstein test in cases involving corporate
donors, stating that use of the "disinterested generosity" standard in
this setting would cause "an important area of tax law .. . [to] beby

the Court of Claims in Singer, the Internal Revenue Service has used it verbatim. See, e.g.,
Rev. Rul. 76-185, 1976-1 C.B. 60; Rev. Rul. 76-257, 1976-2 C.B. 52.
42 449 F.2d at 424.
43 Id.

44 Id. at 423.
45 380 F.2d 146 (1st Cir. 1967). The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the Tax
Court's decision, reported in 46 T.C. 641 (1966), disallowing a charitable contribution deduction
on the basis of the Duberstein test, but on different grounds.
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come a mare's nest of uncertainty woven of judicial value judgements
irrelevent to eleemosynary reality." 4 6 The Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit saw a particular need for such a test in the case of transfers outside a family setting and in a business atmosphere to "prevent
the disguising of compensation for services rendered" as a gift. 47 But
in the area of charitable contribution, the court deemed inquiry into
motive particularly inappropriate because of the diversity of motive,
including such things as "community good will, the desire to avoid
community bad will, public pressures of other kinds, tax avoidance,
prestige, conscience-saving, land] a vindictive desire to prevent relatives from inheriting family wealth." 4 8 This hardly seems persuasive.
Such mixed motives may also be involved in section 102 cases, and
are generally irrelevant. For example, "a vindictive desire to prevent
relatives from inheriting family wealth" should not detract from a taxpayer's generosity in choosing one particular recipient of his charity.
Nor should a taxpayer's desire to gain the approval, or to avoid the
disapproval of his community affect the evaluation of his disinterested
generosity. The expectation of receiving community approval is a just
and normal desire for charitable donors which has never detracted
from the otherwise disinterested generosity of the transfer any more
so than a donor's expectation of gratitude or approval when making a
gift to a family member detracts fiom the nature of the gift.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had occasion to repeat
its rejection of a subjective intention test in the 1972 case of Oppewal
v. Connnissioner.49. In affirming the disallowance of a charitable contribution deduction for payments by parents to a religious education
society, 50 the court espoused a "fundamental objective" test, stated in
the form of a question: "however the payment was designated, and
whatever motives the taxpayers had in making it, was it, to any substantial extent, offset by the cost of services rendered to taxpayers in
the nature of tuition?"51 The answer to this fundamental objective

46 380 F.2d at 146.

47 Id. at 147.
48 Id. at 146.
49 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972),
50 See Oppewal v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1177 (1971), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1000 (1st
Cir. 1972).
51 468 F.2d at 1002. A few months later the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a
case involving facts similar to those in Oppeival, also denied a deduction for payments equal to
the cost of educating the taxpayer's children. Winters -. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir.
1972). The court could not decide, however, which test to adopt, so it simply said that it agreed
with 1oth DeJong and Opptcwal, and found both a lack of donative intent, satisfying the subjective test, and the receipt of sufficient economic benefit to satisfy the objective test. Id. at

780-81.
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test focuses substantially upon the quid pro qto for the transfer, and
does not attempt to rely upon the transferor's subjective mental
52
phenomenon .
A few months later the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
in a case involving facts similar to those in Oppewal, also denied a
deduction for payments equal to the cost of educating the taxpayer's
children. 5 3 The court could not decide, however, which test to
adopt, therefore it simply said that it agreed with both DeJong and
Oppewal, and found both a lack of donative intent, satisfying the subjective test, and the receipt of sufficient economic benefit, satisfying
4
the objective test.1
Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was becoming somewhat uncomfortable with its application of Duberstein to
section 170 cases. In Stubbs v. United States, 5 the taxpayers dedicated a strip of the property which they intended to purchase and
develop to the city planning and zoning board. 56 The use of that
strip as a public road was expected to ensure access to the rest of the
taxpayers' property, and to assist taxpayers in obtaining necessary rezoning. 57 The rezoning was obtained, but the economic benefits expected by taxpayers never materialized.8 In affirming the disallowance of charitable contribution deduction status for the dedication,
the court of appeals noted that the inquiry into motive and purpose
probes beyond the subjective attitude of the donors to "expose the
true nature of the transaction. "5 9 The particular deduction claimed

52 See Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087, 1090 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
53 468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972).
54

Id. at 780-81.

5- 428 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1970).
56 Id. at 886.
57

Id. at 886-87.

58 Id.

at 887. The court held that this actual failure of the land dedication to increase the
value of the rest of the taxpayers' property was irrelevant to the gift test, which focuses upon
the motive and purpose of the transferor prior to the transfer. Id.
59 Id. Whatever was meant by the "true nature of the transaction," that "test" caught the
fancy of the Tax Court in In re Sutton, 57 T.C. 239 (1971), another street dedication case. The
dedication of property in Sutton was to permit the city to widen a street. Taxpayer was one of

several abutting property owners who were approached by the city with a request for such a
donation. Sutton was not planning any particular new use for the property, nor was he seeking
rezoning, but the effect of the city's action was to make the adjoining property available for
commercial uses. The general public would clearly benefit from the action by their own city

government, but Sutton's property acquired additional utility and value which the court found
to be a direct economic benefit to him. Further, with regard to the "true nature of the transac-

tion" the Tax Court found that Sutton showed "no public-spirited, altruistic, benevolent, or
charitable purposes." Id. at 244. Thus, the court's result could have been supported by reliance
upon either a subjective or objective test.
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in Stubbs was disallowed because it was made "in expectation of the

receipt of certain specific direct economic benefits within the power
of' the recipient to bestow directly or indirectly, which otherwise
might not be forthcoming. "60
A few years later the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
flirted briefly with the Duberstein test in Colirnan v. Commissiovur, 61 but then acknowledged in Allen v. United States62 that "the
broad sweep of the Duberstein language was properly questioned- in
United States v. Transamerica Cor-. ,63 and declared that henceforth
it would follow its formulation of the Stubbs test. 64 In all these decisions, however, the court of appeals has steadfastly adhered to its
view that the ultimate question involves the dominant purpose of the
transferor. 65 For instance, even though the court in Allen found
there to be "'an element of quid pro quo" in the transaction, it could
not find clearly erroneous the district court's determination that taxpayer's subjective donative intent was the dominant motive for the
land dedication. 66 'While countenancing such a clearly stated reliance on a subjective test of gift, the Ninth Circuit's simultaneous
reluctance to adhere to its earlier endorsement of Duberstein in section 170 cases is puzzling.
There remains confusion among the various circuit courts of appeals as to the proper test for determining the existence of a charitable contribution. The multiplicity of standards seen in the Tax Court's
428 F.2d at 887.
511 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1975). Collman owned a citrus grove, zoned for agrieulture, in a
county that planned to build a roadway through it, eighty feet in width, which, when completed, would make the grove eligible for residential zoning. Id. at 1265. When the county
notified him that it planned to condemn a sixty foot strip, Colnian contracted with the county
to donate the full eightv' foot strip in return for the county's promise to construct it to that
width with curbs and gutters. Id. Since there was a clearly bargained-for improvement that
added economic value to Collman's land, the Tax Court disallowed a deduction on its finding
that Collman lacked charitable motivation. Id. at 1266. The court of appeals accepted the legal
proposition that Collman's intent was the critical issue, but as to the portion of the property
which the county was prepared to condemn, it reversed the Tax Court's finding of fact, and
accepted Collman's testimony that the donation was made to avoid future condemnation problems and to get a tax deduction. Id. at 1269.
62 541 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1976). Allen dedicated 9.2 acres of redwood forest to a city to
60

6

obtain approval for half-acre residential zoning for his adjacent property. Id. at 787. The district
court, however, found that Allen's predominant motive was to preserve the tract of redwoods,
and the court of appeals was unwilling to determine that this finding was clearly erroneous. Id.
at 788. The court of appeals indicated that the application of an objective test might well have
changed the result. Id. A dissenting opinion argued that it should have. Id. at 789 (Williams, J.,
dissenting).
63 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968). See note 28 supra.
6 542 F.2d at 788. See text accompanying notes 55-60 supra.
65 See, e.g., Allen, 541 F.2d at 788.
66

Id.
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approach is probably due at least in part to this discord among the
circuits. The Tax Court continues to cite DeJong, stating that "if a
payment proceeds primarily from the incentive of anticipated benefit
to the payor beyond the satisfaction which flows from the performance of a generous act it is not a gift."67 It has also added, drawing
from Stubbs, that the inquiry into intent "seeks to expose the true
nature of the transaction. '"68 To avoid skipping any bases, it has also
applied the Singer formulation that the courts seek to distinguish
"between any direct benefit inuring to the transferor . . . and
the benefit which inures to the general public from the transfer
and indirectly to the transferor," 69 a somewhat more artful statement
of the test, and perhaps its idea of what the search for the "true
nature of the transaction" is all about. Finally, the Internal Revenue
Service, which has never shown great affection for the subjective test
in its rulings, has recently relied upon the formulation of the rule in
Singer, which it apparently views as a strictly objective test, except to
the extent that an expectation of economic benefit commensurate
with the value of the property transferred would in part be a matter
of the transferor's state of mind. 70

67 DeJong, 309 F.2d at 379.
68 Stubbs, 428 F.2d at 887. See text accompanying notes 55-60 supra.
6' Seed v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 265 (1971). Taxpayer paid his own expenses for a European golfing tour sponsored by a charitable organization participating in Eisenhower's Peopleto-People program. With government sponsorship it would be difficult for the government to
argue that there was no benefit to the general public, but Seed's benefits flowed directly from
his activities and not indirectly as a member of the general public. Since his benefits were
substantial there was no need to measure the value of the direct and indirect benefits with use
of an objective test.
7o The Service also covered all bases in Rev. Rul. 76-185, 76-1, C.B. 60, in which it repeated the language used in 1954 Committee reports dealing with section 170(c), stating that a
"gift is a voluntary transfer of money or property made by the transferor without receipt or
expectation of a financial or economic benefit commensurate with the money or property transferred." H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A44 (1954); S. REP. No.1622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 196 (1954). The Service also relied upon Singer and Oppetwal as support for its ruling that
an individual who has paid the cost of renovation of a historic building in a state park in return
for rent-free occupancy for 15 years could not deduct his costs as a charitable contribution
except to the extent that he could establish that the payments exceed the monetary value of all
benefits received or expected to be received. See also Rev. Rul. 76-257, 1976-2 C.B. 52, which
involved a payment to a count' to pave a road abutting taxpayer's farm. It was ruled that the
taxpayer could reasonably expect to receive benefits substantially greater than those that would
inure to the general public. This statement appears to fall into the error that the lack of clarity
in the test formulated by Singer, 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971) can easily create. It seems doubtful
that the general public which would use a paved road on regular occasions, would benefit less
from use of the road than would the abutting property owner. But clearly, the taxpayer derived
a separate and substantial benefit from the improvement that was not merely the indirect benefit that would accrue to him as a member of the general public. This reason alone should
have been the basis for the disallowance of the charitable contribution deduction.
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The reluctance displayed by some courts in recent years to carry
over to the charitable contribution cases that substantial body of law
defining gift for purposes of section 102 is unfortunate. The subjective
test of intention or motive is necessary in the more difficult cases,
and presents no difficulties for the factfinders in the easier cases. The
dual standard for making different gift determinations under sections
102 and 170 is also analytically unpersuasive. In Singer, 71 the Court
of Claims was persuaded by the argument that section 170 was intended to be liberally construed in favor of taxpayers, while section
102 was intended to be interpreted narrowly. 72 Yet it can hardly be
said that the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted section 102 in
Stanton c. United States,'7 the companion case to Dubcrstein. In
Stanton, it was suggested that a payment of money to a retiring
employee, although characterized as made in appreciation of past
"services received though not legally nor morally required to be
given," 7 4 might qualify as a gift, excludable firom gross income under
section 102.75 Furthermore, application of the definition of gift developed in section 102 cases need not restrict factfinders fron being
more liberal with taxpayers claiming the charitable contribution deductions should they be so inclined.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has likewise been unpersuasive in opting for a strictly objective test. The faict that a test
based upon intention may be important Linder section 102 primarily
to distinguish between compensation and gift, while being used for
somewhat different purposes in section 170 cases, 76 does not detract
from its utility. Further, since the issue in the charitable contribution
case usually involves a determination of whether a transfer has been
made to obtain benefits in return, it can well be said that under section 170 the courts must also examine the question of whether a
transferor has in reality intended to compensate the transferee for
benefits to be received. The concern expressed by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, that a subjective test would cause section
170 to "become a mare's nest of uncertainty," 77 is simply unwar-

71 Singer, 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl.
72 449 F.2d at 421.

1971). See text accompanying notes 29-44 supra.

73 363 U.S. 278, 281-83, 292-93 (1960).
74 1d. at 295 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
75 Id. at 292-93. The Court, however, remanded the Stanton case to the district court for a

clarification of the factual determinations made and legal standards used by the lower court in
allowing the gratuitous payment to be deducted as a gift. Id.at 293.
76 See Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 146, 147 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 976 (1967).
77 Oppewal, 468 F.2d at 1002; Crosby Valve & Gage Co., 380 F.2d at 146.
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ranted. Difficult cases will always be ensnared in uncertainty. A fundamental objective test may have appeared to the Oppewal court as
the easiest way to resolve the situation in which the cost of educating
the taxpayers' children clearly exceeded the amount of the disallowed
deduction. 78 But let a court face a difficult valuation problem involving intangible benefits such as goodwill, it will find that its objective
test will result in no less uncertainty than the subjective test. Even in
Oppewal, the issue that may have appeared to be simple for the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was actually more complex. The
court found that the taxpayers as parents received benefits, in the
form of payments toward the cost of education, at least as great as the
contribution. 7 9 Its analysis failed, however, to address the important
question of whether the contribution was made in exchange for that
benefit or as an inducement for it. Had the court been considering a
case involving parents of children in a public school system who made
contributions of recreational land for the general use by the city
which operated the school, a strict application of its objective test
could well result in disallowance of the deduction, a clearly improper
result. Since the children had the right to attend the public schools,
the benefit and the contribution should not be linked. The subjective
test, on the other hand, would avoid the result. The intention of the
transferor would not have been to induce the city to educate his children. Rather, the motive would no doubt appear to be an unselfish
one that would support a finding of gift, notwithstanding the direct
benefit that the taxpayer received by way of the education of his children. 0
When one then considers the obvious benefit that the courts,
taxpayers, and Internal Revenue Service alike would obtain from the
additional instruction from section 102 cases defining "gift," there ap78 See notes 49-52 supra and accompanying text.

79 468 F.2d at 1001-02.
80 The similarity of the Oppeucal facts to those in the hypothetical case demonstrates that
the actual motivation of the taxpayers was an important question that the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit did not resolve. The Court stated that -[n]o child obtained the opportunity to
attend the Society's school by reason of any contribution made, nor was any child barred for
lack of a contribution." Id. at 1001. Thus, for example, a finding that taxpayers had failed to
prove their payments to the school had not proceeded primarily from the constraining force of a
moral obligation to support the school which provided services to their children, a test derived
from Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34 (1937), would have provided a better rationale for
the court's holding, without making its task perceptively more difficult. Cf. Jefferson Mills, Inc.
v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ga. 1965), aff'd, 367 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1966) (corporation, concerned about quality of schools available for children of employees, contracted with
city to pay cost of enriching school program, entitled to business expense deduction, unlimited
by section 162(b), which would have disallowed deduction had payments been regarded as
charitable contributions).
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pears to be little or no reason to disavow the importance of those
cases in defining gift under section 170.81 The simplest solution
would be to adopt that same subjective test used in section 102 cases
as the ultimate standard for evaluating a claimed charitable contribution, while reserving the objective comparison of values simply as
evidence of intent; evidence that in many situations would be virtually conclusive as to taxpayers' motives. If the values are relatively
equal, the presumption would arise that there is no donative intent. 82 If the contribution exceeds the value of the benefits received
by the taxpayer, the presumption would be that the requisite donative intent does exist.
There are certain situtations which arise with some frequency
under section 170 and are relatively easy to resolve through the use
of the objective test. In such situations it would be rare that either
the government or the taxpay'er would be able to overcome the presumption raised by application of that test. These are cases in which
the benefit is relatively easy to value and is derived directly from the
recipient organization because of the taxpayer's unique relationship
with that organization . 3 In other cases, however, where the valuation of the benefits is difficult, the objective evidence will be far less
persuasive as to the nature of the taxpayer's motivation, and no good
reason exists for not using the Duberstein tests and the types of evidence traditionally used to make the requisite finding of fact.
1

This proposition would seem to be equally applicable to cases involving corporate con-

tributors. Se United States v. Transamerica Corp., 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968); note 28 supra
and accompanying text. It cannot be gainsaid that corporations take actions which their managers intend to benefit the corporation. Likewise, it is not unusual for corporations to act on the
basis of the generous motives of their managers. To say that a generous act b a corporation,
with no profit-seeking goal, may be ultra vires is to ignore the fact that many state statutes
permit corporations to make charitable contributions to certain classes of donees. Furthermore,
should there be doubt among the managers about the legality of a charitable contribution, it is
always possible to submit the proposed contribution to a vote bx its shareholders. See Stanton
v. United States, 363 U.S. at 282-83.
82 For instance, in the tuition cases, in those situations in which the parents have received
services costing as much as the disallowed deduction, the objective comparison of the benefits
should provide presumptive evidence that the contribution was made primarily in exchange for
the educational services of the school, or wsas primarily induced bv such services. Stated in
more familiar section 102 language, the presumption would be that the payiment w\'as not made
out of detached or disinterested generosity, but rather, was made in expectation of the receipt
of economic benefit in the form of educational services. See notes 46-65 supra and accompanying text.
83 It is not alwavs clear whether a transfer is directly tied to another transaction between
the taxpayer and the recipient organization. For example, in Edgar v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.
717 (1971), a gift of money was found to have been an integral part of a sale of stock to the
corporation which provided sufficient consideration for the gift to result in disallowance of the
contribution deduction. See also Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 91
(E.D. Wis. 1961); Rainier Cos. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 68 (1973).
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OF APPLICATION

Tuition Cases

Cases involving payments to private or parochial schools by parents of children enrolled in those schools have provoked a good deal
of litigation under section 170,84 and have played a prominent role in
the attempt by the courts to determine the application of the Duberstein principles.8 5 In these cases, the Internal Revenue Service has generally disallowed that portion of any contribution to the school or
educational society which was equal to the amount determined to be
allocable to the per pupil cost of education. 86 This result is based
upon the well settled principle that "tuition paid for the education of
the children of a taxpayer is a family expense, not a charitable contribution to the educating institution." 87 Section 170 does, however,
provide for allowance of a deduction for charitable contributions or
gifts to or for the use of organizations which are operated exclusively
for religious or educational purposes. 88 The majority of problem
cases have arisen in situations in which there exists a tightly interrelated church and school structure. In these cases, genuine charitable
contributions are made to both the church and the church-related
school system, portions of which, however, are intended to be, and
are in fact, payments for educational services for taxpayers' children.89 These "payments are not deductible because the donor ex-

'4 See, e.g., Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000 (lst Cir. 1972); Winters v. Commis-

sioner, 468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972); DeJong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962);
Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp 1087 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Channing v. United States, 4 F.
Supp. 33 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 67 F.2d 986 (1st Cir. 1933); Fausner v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 620
(1971); McLaughlin v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 233 (1968).
85 See, e.g., Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087, 1089-90 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
86 See, e.g., Oppewal, 468 F.2d at 1002; DeJong, 309 F.2d at 374-75; Haak v. United
States, 451 F. Supp. 1087, 1093 (W.D. Mich. 1978). The most recent opinion in this area,
however, has expressed a concern over the difficulty in fixing the amount of payments attributable to the cost of the children's education and therefore disallowed. Haak v. United States, 451
F. Supp. 1087, 1093 n.8 (W.D. Mich. 1978). For a discussion of the difficulty in determining
and defining the costs of education, see McNulty, Tax Policy in Tuition Credit Legislation:
Federal Income Tax Allowances for Personal Costs of Higher Education, 61 CAL. L. REv. 1,
52-57 (1973).
87 DeJong, 309 F.2d at 376; Channing, 4 F. Supp. at 34-35. Expenditures made for tuition

are treated as "personal, living, or family expenses" under section 262 of the code, and accordingly cannot be deducted from gross income. See McNulty, supra note 86, at 1 & n.I. It is
reasoned that payments of tuition and donations to educational organizations made by taxpayers
in consideration for educational services are not made with the requisite donative intent to
qualify as a charitable contribution or gift under section 170. Rev. Rul. 71-112, 1971-1 C.B. 93.
88 26 U.S.C.
89

§ 170(c)(2)(B)(1954).
Such portions of the contributions that are deemed to be in the nature of tuition pay-

ments for educational services "are only a quid pro quo and cannot therefore further the charit-
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pects, and in fact received, a definite economic benefit. ' 90 Usually,
tile taxpayers have claimed that neither the church nor the school
system actually required tuition payments, and that children are not
denied admission to the schools if their parents fail to contribute financially to the church or school system. 91 In fact, the only pressure
brought to bear on the taxpayer is that which comes from the religiOtis community as a whole, which strongly encourages parents "to
contribute to the best of their ability and to try to carry as much 'of
the load [of the schools' operating budget] as the\, can.' "92
The courts, however, have generally held that the mere absence
of a legal obligation to make a fixed tuition payment does not establish that such a payment constitutes a charitable contribution deductible under section 170. 9 In DeJtig, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the Duberstcin test of gift was "clearly
applicable to a charitable deduction under section 170," 9 4 and held
that the fact-finders' determination depended upon whether the contribution proceeded from "detached and disinterested generosity,'"
on the one hand, or primarily from " 'the incentive of anticipated
benefit of an economic nature,' " on the other. 95 The First Circuit's
able purposes of the organization to the same extent as an outright gift would." Haak v. United
States, 451 F. Sopp. 1087, 1091 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
90 Winters v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 778, 780 (2d Cir. 1972). See Rev. Rul. 76-185, 1976-1
C.B. 60.
91 Oppewal, 468 F.2d at 1001; Winters v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 778, 780 (2d Cir. 1972);
DeJong, 309 F.2d at 375; Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087, 1090 n.2 (W.D.Mich.
1978).
92 DeJong, 309 F.2d at 375. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in DeJong, facing
this typical type of situation involving a church-related educational society, stated:
Although the Society set no tuition fee, the record clearly shows that parents who
could so afford were expected to contribute to the Society at least to the extent of
the cost to the Society of providing their children with an education.
Id. at 379. Therefore, in this sense, it might also be said that these payments proceed "primarilyfrom 'the constraining force of [a] moral . . . duty.' " Duberstein. 363 U.S. at 285 (quoting
Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937)). A distinction is necessarv at this point,
however, in order to reach an understanding of the meaning of moral duty as intended by the
Supreme Court. Obviously, many people make charitable contributions because they feel a
moral obligation to support some worthwhile charitable activity, for example, to help provide
care for those too poor to provide for their own needs. This iscertainly not the type of moral
obligation that the Supreme Court spoke of in Bogardus and Duberstein. Rather, in the tuition
cases, it would be the moral obligation felt because of the direct receipt of valuable educational
services from the school system that would militate against donative intent. In any' event, the
courts have uniformly upheld the disallowance of the deduction in this type of case without
relying upon a "'moral duty" inquiry.
93 See, e.g., Winters v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 778, 780 (2d Cir. 1972); DeJong, 309 F.2d
at 379.
94 309 F.2d at 379.
9' Id. See Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087, 1090 (W.D. Mich. 1978). The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit's opinion in Winters seems to rely upon this same criterion in
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Oppetval decision, however, "expressed .. .dissatisfaction with such
subjective tests as to the taxpayer's motives in making a purported
charitable contribution."- 9 6 Instead, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit focused the inquiry upon the question of whether the payment
was "to any substantial extent, offset by the cost of services rendered
to taxpayers in the nature of tuition, ' 9 7 a clearly objective test. The
currently recognized standard that has emerged from these cases was
expressed most recently in Haak v. United States.98 The facts in
Haak were very similar to those in Dejong, Oppewal and Winters v.
Coinnmissioner.99 The court in Haak ostensibly "reject[ed] the 'pure'
Duberstein test focusing on motive alone in favor of a 'fundamental
objective' or "qid pro quo" test."100 Despite this disavowal of the
subjective test, however, the Haak court used language unmistakenly
derived from Dtiberstein 101 in focusing upon the intent of the tax-

payer, and concluding that "a transfer ... made with expectation of
receiving a benefit" is not a charitable contribution under section

170.

102

In any event, the result in Haak, and in all such cases, is

that the portion of the total contributions made during the tax year
which the Service determines to have been made with an expectation

the subjective test, inasmuch as the Court concluded that "the taxpayers' payments were made
with the anticipation of economic benefit," and therefore were in the nature of tuition and not
deductible. Winters v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 778, 781 (2d Cir. 1972).
96 Oppewal, 468 F.2d at 1002.
97 Id. See Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087, 1090 ('W.D. Mich. 1978).
98 451 F. Supp. 1087 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
99 468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972). In Haak, as in Winters, taxpayers made contributions to
their church, a portion of which was paid to an affiliated school system educating the children of
taxpayers. 451 F. Supp. 1088. As in DeJong, the parents were made aware of the operating
budget and expenses of the schools, and encouraged to contribute, according to their means, to
offset the financial obligations assumed by the church on behalf of families with enrolled students. Id. at 1088-89.
100 Haak, 451 F. Supp. at 1090.
i0i In Duberstein, the Supreme Court drew upon language from its decision in Bogardus v.
Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937), stating that "if the payment proceeds primarily . . . from
'the incentive of anticipated benefit' of an economic nature, it is not a gift." 363 U.S.
at 285
(citation omitted).
102 Haak, 451 F. Supp. at 1092. The court attempted to draw a semantic distinction between
a test focusing on the "motive" of the taxpayer and one focusing on the "expectation" of the
taxpayer. Id. at 1092 & n.5. The distinction is an artificial one, however, since Duberstei and
its progeny teach that the expectation of economic benefit is simply one factor in the determination of the taxpayer's subjective intention. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285; Winters, 468 F.2d at
781; Dejong, 309 F.2d at 379; Fausner v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 620, 624 (1971); McLaughlin
v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 233, 234-35 (1968). In McLaughlini, the Tax Court held that "it is the
taxpayer's motive that is relevant," id.at 235, and that motive is reflected by taxpayer's "expectation of benefits in return for" the payment. Id. Therefore, while the court in Haak reached
the inevitably correct result, its attempt to disavow adherence to the Duberstein and DeJong
test of donative intent was unnecessarv and artificial.
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of a quid pro quo in the form of educational benefits is disallowed as
a section 170 deduction.
The Internal Revenue Service recently considered a similar case
where it was clear that all contributions were placed in the general
fund of the religious society so that tracing contributions for use by the

society's school was not possible.' 0 3 After first stating that a subjective test based on whether the taxpayer may expect to receive benefits equal to the contribution should apply, the ruling concluded
that where the cost of the schooling of taxpayer's children exceeds the
amount of the contribution, no deduction is permitted. Although not
expressly putting ultimate reliance on the subjective test, with objective valuations being used only as evidence, the ruling came very
1 4
close to adopting that position.

Bargain Sales
It has been accepted with little dispute that a sale of property by
the taxpayer to a charitable organization for a consideration less than
the fair market value of the property results in a charitable contribution deduction for the taxpayer. 105 Subject to certain limitations, 106

the transferor is allowed to consider the bargain element, which is
the property's fair market value minus the bargain selling price, as a
contribution to the charity without discussion of the taxpayer's in-

tent. 107 In bargain sale cases where no difficulty is experienced with
the valuation of the property transferred and the benefit received,
this creates little problem because disinterested generosity in giving
the bargain to charity is easily presumed, and, in the absence of other
103 Rev. Rul. 79-99, C.B.108. 1979-1 C.B.108.
104 In Pub. Law No. 96-74, Congress has prohibited the Internal Revenue Service from using
finds to implement any\ ruling that would deny a charitable deduction for contributions to the
general foods of religious organizations even if the' might be providing private schooling for
members of the taxpayer's family. It seems rather clear that this was not enacted with a view to
influencing the determination of the place of subjective and objective tests in interpreting section 170.
'05 Congress recognized this treatment of the "bargain sale to charity" when it enacted the
basis allocation provisions of section 1011(b) in the Tax Reform Act of 1969. 26 U.S.C. § 1011(b)
(1969). In cases in which a section 170 deduction is allowed bv reason of a bargain sale to
charity, the transferor's cost or basis for measuring gain is oniy that portion of his total cost or
basis for the property which the amount realized bears to the fair market value of the property.
Section 1011(b) provides that this is basis multiplied by the bargain selling price and then
divided by the fair market value of the property. Id. Treas. Reg. § 1.1011-2 (1972).
w6 The charitable deduction rules governing contributions of appreciated property, contained
in section 170 (e)(1), might apply to limit or eliminate anv charitable deduction having to do
with the bargain sale. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(e)(1) (1976). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4 (c)
(1972); Treas. Reg. § 1.1011-2 (1972).
107 See Rev. Rul. 75-348, 1975-2 C.B. 75.
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evidence, could well meet the burden of proving that the transferor's
motivations were donative in character.108 In general, however, the
Internal Revenue Service and the courts have rarely concerned them-

selves with the question of whether some subjective selfish purpose
may have induced the transaction.109

Miscellaneous Beitefits Easily Valued
Situations often arise in which taxpayers have purchased tickets
for dinners, dances, athletic games, and other events run by charitable
organizations. In a manner analogous to bargain sales to charity, when
the fair narket value of the benefits received by the taxpayer is
clearly less than the ticket price, the difference is normally treated as

a charitable contribution. 110
108

There should be a presumption, how-

The motive of avoiding taxes through a bargain sale of appreciated property to a founda-

tion created by the seller has led the Internal Revenue Service to attack the charitable status of
the foundation, and, thus, the deductibilitv of the contributions to it. See Waller v. Comissioner, 39 T.C. 665 (1963). The Tax Court, however, made short shrift of this argument. Id. at
676. In Gladstein v. United States, 21 A.F.T.R. 2d 616 (E.D. Okla. 1968), the court stated that
a charitable contribution deduction would be allowed in the case of a clear bargain sale if there
was an intent to make a gift of the excess value. The court had no difficulty in finding such
intent.
109 See Mason v. United States, 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975). In Mason, the situation was
characterized by the court as a bargain sale, although it might have been regarded as the
transfer of the use of ionev for less than a fair market interest rate. Property worth $117.000
was sold for installment notes with a face value of S117,000, but with such a low interest rate
that the present value of the notes was determined to be $81,000. The court described the
taxpayer's donative intent as a critical question, but found ample evidence to sustain the jury
finding that the requisite intent was present, stating inter alia that -[t]he magnitude of the
economic benefit conferred upon the charity is itself strongly probative of a donative intent." Id.
at 27-28, n.9.
In Singer, the court did not concern itself with the "disinterested generosity" of the corporate transferor. 449 F.2d at 421-22. Rather, the court formulated its hvbrid standard concerned
with substantial benefits received or expected to be received by Singer, in excess of those
benefits which accrue to the public in general as a result of such charitable contributions. Id. at
423. See notes 29-44 supra and accompanying text. In their consideration of the bargain sale
issues involved in Grinslade v. Commissioner, however, the Tax Court was indeed concerned
with the transferor's subjective intention in conveying a parcel of land to the City of Indianapolis. Grinslade v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 566, 577 (1973). The Tax Court held that the
"requisite charitable intent [was] lacking'" where the conveyance by the taxpayer was made
"'with the expectation of receiving financial benefits commensurate with the property conveyed."
Id. The court indicated that in its inquiry with regard to the requisite donative intent, it sought
a showing of "a public-spirted, altruistic, benevolent, or charitable purpose" on the part of
taxpayer in making the transaction. Id.
ii0 Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, at 105. See Goldman v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d 476
(6th Cir. 1967). Cf. Shoshone-First Nat'l Bank, 72-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 1 9119 (D. Wvo. 1971)
(bank allowed $650 deduction when it contributed $1000 and received in return $350 commemorative rifle). The Service, in Rev. Rul. 74-348, 1974-2 C.B. 80, distinguished its 1967
ruling. A hypothetical situation posed in the earlier ruling had led to the conclusion that the
price of a ticket could not be deducted if the person decided not to attend the performance, yet
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ever, that in such situations the benefits conferred upon the taxpayer
equal the price of the ticket. "I Therefore, the burden should rest
on the taxpayer to prove that the purchase price was greater than the
value of the benefits received. Absent such proof, courts have sometimes disallowed the deduction. 112
Clearly, these situations inappropriately suggest the use of an objective approach. Probably for this reason courts have not concerned
themselves with scrutinizing the subjective intent of the donor;
rather, the focus is placed upon the objective considerations of money
paid and benefits received. 113 Also, the Internal Revenue Service

has ruled that donative intent may not always be essential in such
cases where the value of the benefit received is clear and the dona-

tive intent can thereby be inferred but will be highly relevant in
cases where valuation of the benefit is difficult. 114 A leading case
illustrating these principles is Goldnian v. Cononissioner,115 where

the taxpayer attempted to claim a charitable deduction for the purchase of raffle tickets. Taxpayer testified that his only intent was to
make a gift to the charitable organization. The trier of fact, however,
gave little credence to his unrebutted testimony regarding intent.

The taxpayer conceded that the prize offered in the raffle was valuable, and he failed to negate the presumption that the purchase price
of the ticket equaled the value of the chance to win the prize. For
this reason the Tax Court disallowed the deduction.

116

failed to give up his ticket, which controlled the exercise of his right to admission. Rev. Rul.
67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, at 108. The 1974 ruling stated that an absolute relinquishment of the
ticket to the organization for resale entitled the taxpayer to a charitable deduction. whether the
ticket was resold or not. Rev. Rul. 74-348, 1974-2 C.B. 80, at 80.
"I See Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, at 105.
112 See Goldman v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d 476, 480 (6th Cir. 1967); Cogan v. Cominmissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 986, 989 (1971); Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, at 105. The
taxpayer must establish the fair market value of the benefit. Generally, this is a simple matter.
For example, with things like tickets to athletic and artistic events, the taxpayer need only
prove the regular cost of such an event, see Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, at 106, however, of a somewhat more difficult nature are events such as dinners and dances. The Service has
suggested that the organizations which run these events should "make clear not only that a gift
is being solicited in connection with the sale of the admissions . . but also, the amount of the
gift being solicited." Id. at 105.
11 See, e.g., Goldman v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 136 (1966), aff'd, 388 F.2d 476 (6th Cir.
1967); Shoshone-First Nat'l Bank, 72-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 1 9119 (D. Wvo. 1971).
114 Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, at 105. An interesting use of the subjective test to
disallow a deduction occurred recently in a case where the potential quid pro quo was easily
valued but the connection between it and the "contribution" was not clear. Considine v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 69 (1980).
115 388 F.2d 476 (6th Cir. 1967).
i16 See Goldman v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 136, 139 (1966).
In Goldman, the Tax Court
claimed that the taxpayer "received full consideration and got just what he paid for." Id.
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In affirming the Tax Court's decision of disallowance, the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also relied upon objective considerations. The court based its decision upon the narrow grounds of the
taxpayer's failure to offer proof of a difference in value between the
ticket price and the chance purchased. 117 It did, however, leave the
door open for a contrary result in similar circumstances when it stated
by way of dictum that, had the actual value of the chance been minute in comparison to its purchase price, "the charitable nature of the
gift would scarely [have been] debated," and the deduction would
have been allowed.

118

In other cases where the taxpayer receives from the donee organization services or other benefits clearly having a value equal to
the contribution, courts have had little difficulty in disallowing the
claimed deduction. For example, in Win berg v. Commissioner,119
the taxpayer had paid $5,000 to a church in return for a $5,000 reduction in the purchase price of timber. And in Seed v. Commissioner,120
a taxpayer paid his own expenses for a European golfing tour sponsored by a charitable organization participating in Eisenhower's
People-to-People program. In these cases the courts made findings
with regard to the lack of donative intent, but clearly these are situations where the objective test provides compelling evidence of donative intent.
Land Dedication Cases
One type of case that is frequently litigated involves taxpayers
who dedicate a portion of their property to a local government which,
in turn, uses it for a street, park, or for some other public facility.
Clearly, these contributions benefit the public, which benefit is an
important criterion in determining deductibility. If, however, the
property owners obtain or expect to obtain some form of consideration from the government, such as the rezoning of retained property,
there is doubt as to the taxpayers' donative intent. In deciding the
deductability of such contributions, the courts have encountered great
difficulty, not only in distinguishing between direct and incidental
117

388 F.2d at 480. The taxpayer did attempt to argue that the true value of the ticket could

be determined bv dividing the value of the prize by the number of tickets sold. The court
stated that the record before it did not allow for even this simple computation. Furthermore,
the court questioned such an approach, presumably because this value and the fair market value
are not the same. See id.
11s

1d.

19 326 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1963).
120 57 T.C. 265 (1971). See also Summers v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 695
(1974) (church hall rental for wedding held not deductible).
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benefits, but also in valuing these benefits. Therefore, the courts
have found the objective tests to be of little help in determining taxpayers' charitable intent.
The problem of analyzing donative intent has presented the least
difficulty in cases in which taxpayers are "compelled" to donate land
in order to obtain a zoning change. 121 In Jordan Perlmutter v.
Commissioner, 122 for example, the taxpayers sought zoning changes
that would permit the development of what they described as
"planned communities." There, the County Planning and Zoning
Board had regulations which required, as a condition to approval of
subdivisions, that the owner convey to the county no less than eight
percent of the gross area of the land for schools, recreational and
similar public facilities. 123 The taxpayers complied with the regulation and claimed a charitable contribution deduction on the theory
that they were under no legal compulsion to donate the land since
they claimed that the regulation was unconsitttional. 124 The Tax
Court disallowed the deduction. While acknowledging the dispute
surrounding the application of section 102 principles to section 170,
the court saw no reason to become entangled in that dispute. 125
Instead, it simply decided that it would "overtax imagination" to
allow the deduction in this case. 126 The court based this determination upon two findings of fact. First, the taxpayers had acted under
the "compulsion of compliance with a colorable legal requirement."' 1 27 Second, the taxpayers received a direct benefit as the result of the transfer. This consisted of both the avoidance of possible
protracted litigation in obtaining the necessary zoning and the enhanced value of the subdivisions by reason of their proximity to
121

See, e.g., United States v. Transamerica, Inc., 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968); Woodside

Mills v. United States, 260 F.2d 935 (4th Cir. 1958); Petit v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 634 (1974).
122 45 T.C. 311 (1965),
123 Id. at 313.
124 Id. at 316-17. The taxpayers never challenged the constitutionality of the regulation in a
court of law. Id.
125 Id.
at 317. The court stated'
At the outset, it should be noted that most of the cases in the gift area do not
involve charitable contributions but rather deal with situations where the payments
were in varying degrees connected with services rendered bv the recipients. It does

not necessarily follow that the principles underlying these cases are fully applicable
in the area of charitable contributions such as is involved herein. In any event, we
see no need to cut our way through the thicket of subjective and occasionall,
ephemeral concepts with which the decided cases bristle.
Ill.
126
127

Id, (citing Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98, 100 (1943)).
45 T.C. at 318. This statement is similar to the suggestion in Bogardus v. Commissioner,

302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937), that a transfer of property is not a gift if it proceeds from the "constrain-

ing force of any moral or legal dut,." Id.
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schools and recreational facilities. 128 The court distinguished this latter benefit from the incidental benefit that taxpayers might have received as a member of the general public. 129 It is of interest that
the Tax Court made no attempt to value the direct benefit, and, although it did not express the thought, it must have regarded the
direct benefit as substantial enough to disallow the deduction in the
absence of proof by the taxpayers of the value of the benefits received. Perhaps its overtaxed imagination could more easily have
been explained by reference to Duberstein and its progeny.
Even if the taxpayer is not legally compelled to donate property,
he is often motivated by the expectation of recovery of commensurate
benefit, and where this is direct and substantial, he should have the
burden of proving a detached and disinterested generosity. 130 This
conceivably could be evidenced by the fact that the rezoning would
have occurred without the gift, 131 that the taxpayer had not sought
the change, 132 or that the donation was made primarily to obtain a

128 45 T.C. at 318. In addition,

the taxpayer argued that the amount of land donated ex-

ceeded the legal requirement, and was therefore a valid charitable contribution. The court,
however, did not have to resolve this issue since the taxpayer failed to prove the exact amount
of the excess land. 1d. at 318-19. It is also of interest that the Tax Court made no attempt to
value this direct benefit. Although it did not express the thought, it must have regarded the
direct benefit as substantial enough to disallow the deduction in the absence of proof by the
taxpayers of the value of the benefits received.
129 45 T.C. at 318. Judge Fay concurred in the result of this case, but expressed the questionable view that the enhancement in value of the retained land bv reason of its proximity to
schools and recreational facilities constructed on the transferred property was not a direct benefit but. only an incidental one accruing to taxpayers as members of the general public. Id. at
319 (Fa', J., concurring in result). This view was adopted in Seldin v. Commissioner, 28
T.C.M. (CCH) 1215 (1969), where the court found that it would stretch credulity to disallow a
contribution of property simply because resulting subdivisions attracted homebuvers to the area
which would enhance the value of the taxpayer's commercial properties. 28 T.C.M. (CCH) at
1222. Accord, Scheffres v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 234 (1969).
130 Accord, Rev. Rul. 57-488, 1957-2 C.B. 157. See, e.g., Stubbs v. United States, 428 F.2d
885, 887 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1970); Grinslade v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.
566, 574 (1973); Ackerman Buick, Inc. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 1061, 1062-63
(1973). But see Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 900, 906 (W.D.S.C.
1965); Scharf v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 1247, 1252 (1973); O'Toole v. Commissioner,
63-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 1 9267 (M.D. Fla. 1963). These cases draw the distinction between a
substantial direct benefit and an incidental direct benefit. They do not examine the taxpayer's
motives but instead weigh the benefit to the public against the private benefit. See generally
Annot., 30 A.L.R. Fed. 796, 808-09 (1976). Cf. Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104 (the presumption in quid pro quo transfer is against gift).
131 See Allen v. United States, 541 F.2d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 1976).
132 Compare Collman v. Commissioner, 511 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1975) with Sutton v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 239 (1971). In Colliman the taxpayer's lack of knowledge that a street widening program initiated by the government would permit residential zoning for his unprofitable
citrus grove was a factor in the allowance of a deduction. 511 F.2d at 1268-69. On the other
hand, in Sutton, the taxpayer, a real estate dealer, donated land to the town so the town could
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strong civic image. 133 It is not surprising that taxpayers generally fail
to offer this type of evidence; it is not usually available. It is strange,
however, that courts do not refer to this burden of proof when there
is a link between the zoning decision and the dedication of property. 134
A troublesome situation, similar to the zoning cases, arises when
a taxpayer dedicates land which the city promises to maintain or improve. The problem in these cases is to distinguish between a taxpayer who naturally wants the donated property to be maintained and
the taxpayer who bargains for this upkeep simply to attain an
economic benefit. Reliance on the subjective test would normally be
helpful in resolving this issue.
In WVolfe v. Commissioner, 135 the taxpayer was a resident of a
small community that contracted to have a central sewer and water
system installed. Each resident paid for his pro rata share and then
donated his or her interest to the city in exchange for its agreement
to maintain and operate the system. Anyone using the system was
required to pay a monthly fee to cover operation costs. The taxpayer
hooked into both systems but only used the sewer lines. 136 Obviously, the taxpayer benefited as a member of the small community;
but he also received a direct benefit, the present use of the sewer
system and possible future use. 137 The Tax Court recognized that
the taxpayer's home increased in value, that the gift was made in
conjunction with the donations of the other residents, and that he had
exchanged his interest for the town's promise to maintain the systens. 138 The court therefore concluded that the taxpayer's act "did
not proceed primarily from a detached and disinterested generosity,
but primarily from the incentive of an anticipated benefit of an

widen the street for commercial traffic. Although he did not seek the zoning change he knew
that if he did donate this land, his remaining land would go up sharply in value. The court
therefore concluded that he lacked donative intent. 57 T.C. at 243-44.
133 See Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. United States, 743 F. Supp. 900 905 (W.D.S.C. 1965).
134 In its rulings, the Internal Revenue Service has not ignored the burden of proof question.
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 103. Cf Rev. Rul. 76-185, 1976-1 C.B. 60 (taxpayer
renovated historic mansion on state land in return for right to reside therein for 15 years held
not entitled to deduction unless he could establish that renovation costs exceeded value of all
benefits received or reasonably expected to be received).
135 54 T.C. 1707 (1970). A case of this type which was easy to resolve with an objective test
was Louisville & N.R.R. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 962 (1976), where a city contracted to build
a new subway, baggage room, and transfer room in consideration for the dedication of an easement for an underpass under the taxpayer's property.
136 54 T.C. at 1711-12.
137 Id. at 1715.
138 I. at 1715-16.
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economic nature." 139 This provides an obvious example of the value
of a subjective test for charitable contributions.
In such a case an objective approach would be very difficult to
apply. The taxpayer was paying a fee for the one system he was using
so the direct benefit the court relied on could have been termed
incidental. Also, although the city promised to maintain the system,
presumably they would have done so absent any explicit promise.
The subjective test, however, indicates that the deduction should be
disallowed, since the taxpayer transferred property pursuant to a preconceived plan in which all the residents participated. Thus. it was
not an isolated donation with the required detached and disinterested
generosity. 140
Miscellaneous Cases Involving Benefits Not Easily Valued
Other cases also involve contributions where the taxpayer receives direct but intangible benefits that are difficult to value. In
these cases the subjective test is particularly useful in resolving the
deduction issue under section 170.
In the past, the issue frequently arose as to whether a deduction
should be granted to employers who donated money to a trust or
fund whose beneficiaries were employees. The income derived from
these trusts was used for pensions, life insurance, and health insurance coverage.1 4 1 Early decisions found these contributions to be
139 Id.

at 1715. Similarly, a deduction was not allowed when a county solicited and received

contributions from farmers for paving roads abutting their farms. Rev. Rul. 76-257, 1976-2 C.B.
52. The ruling stated that "since the roads were in the vicinity of the taxpayer's property, the
taxpayer could reasonably expect to receive benefits substantially greater than those that would
inure to the general public." Id. Cf. Rev. Rul. 69-90, 1969-1 C.B. 63 (allowing deduction for
contributions by merchants and property owners to city to provide public parking facilities in
general area of their businesses and properties where amounts of contributions bore no particular relationship to amount of use that contributors and their patrons might receive). The latter
ruling could be questioned on the basis that the merchants clearly received a direct benefit that
would not inure to them as members of the general public. The Internal Revenue Service failed
to qualify its ruling to indicate that if a particular contributor's private benefit were commensurate with his contribution, the deduction would not be allowed. See also Monterey Pub. Parking
Corp. v. United States, 481 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1973); Rev. Rul. 73-113, 1973-1 C.B. 65.
140 Compare to Wolfe, the case of Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. United States, 243 F. Supp.
900 (W.D.S.C. 1965), where the court found a donative intent. There a bank donated land
to the state on the condition that it be used for a highway. This road was considered an
integral part of the revitalization of a downtown city that was suffering from urban blight. The
bank had recently moved into the downtown area and would accordingly benefit from the revitalization. In addition, it wanted to donate the land as a public relations gesture. Id. at 90203.
," This issue has diminished in importance as the result of extensive revisions in the Code
allowing deductions for employer contributions to employer benefit plans. See I.R.C. §§ 401415.
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deductible. 142 More recently, however, the courts have recognized
the quid pro quo which the contributor's business receives from the
intangible benefit of improved employee relations, and have denied
the claimed deductions. 143 Surprisingly, most of these cases have
not concerned themselves as much with the motivations of the contributors, which was unequivocally business oriented, as with the
14 4
charitable nature of the organizations' activities.
Analogous to the employer-donation situations are cases where
an individual creates a trust having a charitable purpose, but the trustee is compelled or directed to give preference to relatives or friends
of the settlor. Although this is clearly a direct benefit inuring to the
grantor, it is not susceptible to valuation. 145 It would follow, however, that since the settlor receives a direct benefit, the courts could
employ the Duberstein test to scrutinize his motives. Nevertheless,
courts have failed to do so; they have only examined the charitable
purpose of the trust itself. For example in Schoellkoplf v. United
States, 146 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that
permitting a trust to provide aid to members of the grantor's family
did not detract from its charitable nature. 147 The court said, however, that if the trust had compelled such use of its assets, they might
have disallowed the deductions. 148 The fact that relatives might in
some way benefit from the trust is not necessarily inconsistent with a
charitable intent. This is an indirect benefit that only inures to the
settlor's relatives as members of the general public. However, if the
grantor compels the trustee to favor relatives, donative intent is certainly suspect. An issue which lies somewhere between the two extremes set forth in Schoellkoplf, is that of an express preference for
142 See, e.g.,

Gimbel v.

Commissioner, 54 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1931) (contribution by

stockholders); Estate of Leonard Carlson v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 291 (1953) (bequest qualified
for estate tax deduction); T.J. Moss Tie Co. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 188 (1952) (contribution
by corporate employer); In re Sibley, 16 B.T.A. 915 (1929). But see note 93 supra.
143 See, e.g., Watson v. United States, 355 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1964); Estate of Leeds v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 781 (1970). Watson was an estate tax deduction case in which the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, relying on Rev. Rul. 56-138, 1956-1 C.B. 202, expressly disapproved of its previous decision in Gimbel v. United States, 54 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1931). Watson
v. United States, 355 F.2d at 271. Leeds also involved an estate tax and it relied on Watson in
overruling in earlier case of Estate of Carlson v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 291 (1953). Estate of
Leeds v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. at 791.
'" See note 143 supra.
145 Why the Internal Revenue Service and the courts have never concerned themselves with
whether this type of case might involve a prohibited inurement of net earnings to private individuals is mystifying.
146 124 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1942).
147 Id. at 985.
148 Id.
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relatives. In general, courts have allowed a deduction despite the
stated preference by the settlor.149 Here again, courts have paid little attention to charitable motives which they might well have
doubted.
The taxpayers received an interesting form of intangible benefit
in Edward A. Murphy v. Commissioner, 150 when they procured a
child through an adoption agency which qualified as a charitable organization. The agency required all new parents to pay ten percent of
a year's salary if they could afford it. Taxpayers complied with the
agency's request and claimed a charitable deduction for the gift. 151
The court could easily have applied the Duberstein test to deny the
deduction since the donation was motivated by the services rendered.
It decided, however, to apply an objective test, claiming that the
taxpayers had failed to prove that the value of the agency's services
was less than the payment. 152 Although this court denied the deduction, the failure to use the subjective test caused the court to ignore
the intangible benefit of obtaining a child which the taxpayers received.
In some cases, taxpayers have claimed a charitable deduction for
a fee paid to an exempt retirement or old age home in apparent consideration for admission to the home. 153 It has not always been clear
whether the fee was required for admission and, if it was not, the
value of the admission to the home may be difficult to value when
the taxpayer must also pay a monthly charge for staying in the
home. 154 A failure to give adequate attention to the subjective motivation of the taxpayer, placing the burden of proof both as to motive
and valuation of exchanged benefits, probably contributed substan149 See, e.g.,

Marshall v. Welch,

197 F. Supp. 874 (S.D. Ohio 1961); Waller v. Commis-

sioner, 39 T.C. 665 (1963); Estate of Sells v. Comnmissioner, 10 T.C. 692 (1948); Estate of
Robinson, I T.C. 19 (1942). But see United States v. Bank of America Nat'l Tnst Say. & Ass'n,
326 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1963), a case decided under a related provision of the Code, I.R.L.
642(c), involving the now defunct deduction for property set aside by a trust for exclusively
charitable purposes. There a charitable trust which provided free hospital rooms, first to a group
of named beneficiaries who were relatives of the grantor, and only then to other persons was
invalidated on the grounds that the fund was not limited to assistance to needy relatives. Id. at
55.
1so 54 T.C. 249 (1970).
151 Id. at 251.
152 Id. at 254. Accord, In re Arceneaux, 36 T.C. M. (CCH) 1461, 1464 (1977). But cf.
'Wegener v. Lethert, 67-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9229 (D. Minn. 1967) (agency failed to meet state
requirements that would have allowed it to seek compensation; therefore contribution was

charitable).
153 See, e.g., Sedam v. United States, 518 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975).
154 Estate of Wardwell v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1962), rev'g, 35 T.C. 443
(1960).

1980]

CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS

tially to apparent error in one case.' 5 5 An easier case is presented
when the consideration is clearly bargained for. In such case the subjective test would call for disallowance of any deduction and one case
has appropriately reached that result. 1 56 The Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit has also applied the subjective test and, relying on
expectation of the receipt of any
fact findings that the donor had no
1 57
benefit, permitted the deduction.
Singer, which remains the focus of the continued dispute over
the application of the Duberstein test, is a relatively good example of
a case in which the deduction issue should turn on the donative intent of the corporation. 158 The corporate donor received goodwill in
exchange for its discounted sales. 159 It would indeed have been difficult to measure this type of benefit in a dollar amount and the Court
of Claims made no real attempt to do so. Nevertheless, the failure of
the taxpayer to establish the value of this direct benefit, once its existence was made apparent, could have been an important factor in the
court's determination that donative intent was lacking. Instead, the
court found that the purpose behind the transfers was probative of
whether the benefit to the corporation was substantial enough to
deny the existence of bargain sales to schools and to allow the deduc160
tion for sales to other qualified recipients.
CONCLUSION

The Internal Revenue Service and the courts appear to be in full
agreement that a contribution, to be deductible under section 170,
must qualify as a gift; yet they remain undecided as to whether the
Dubersteiin test of gift for purposes of section 102 is an appropriate
test for charitable contributions. No good reason appears for not applying this test. An objective comparison of the value of the contribu-

155 Sedam v. United States. 518 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975) (reversed district court finding that

payments constituted charitable contributions).
156 Id.
157 Dowell v. United States, 553 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1977).
158 The determination of a corporation's intent has not troubled courts in other areas. Indeed
in Stanton v. United States, 363 U.S. 278 (1960), the Supreme Court remanded the case for a
finding as to whether a corporation had the requisite corporate intent for exclusion of a claimed
gift under section 102. 363 U.S. at 292. See note 40 supra. See also Rev. Rul. 69-90, 1969-1
C.B. 63 (contributions by merchants for public parking held gift notwithstanding intangible
benefit received); Rev. Rul. 73-113, 1973-1 C.B. 65 (contributions for relief of pollution from
offshore oil spill held to benefit business contributor enough to be deductible business expense,
and not gift, notwithstanding section 162(b)).
15" Singer, 449 F.2d at 423-24.
160 Id. See notes 40-41 supra.
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tion with the received benefit will still be virtually conclusive of the
ultimate question in many cases and useful in varying degrees in
others.
There also remains confusion as to whether the benefits received
by the contributor should be measured against the benefits that inure
to the general public, or whether the benefits received by the contributor from the recipient organization should be measured against
the benefits that the contributor receives as a member of the general
public. It would appear that a decision should first be made as to
whether the contributor receives a benefit directly from the organization or whether he only receives an incidental benefit by reason of his
membership in the general public served by the organization. If there
is a direct benefit received, and whether or not any incidental benefit
is received as a member of the public, then that direct benefit should
be measured against the benefit that the general public receives. This
should be the comparison to be made when applying the objective
test for purposes of assisting in the application of the Duberstein
principles.

